

Network Epidemiology

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**SANTA FE
INSTITUTE**


**We can't stop pandemics
without using real-time, high-
resolution mobility data.**

Farr's Law

Epidemics appear to be generated at intervals in unhealthy places, spread, and go through a regular course, and decline; but of the cause of their evolutions no more is known than of the periodical paroxysms of ague. . . . If the latent cause of epidemics cannot be discovered, the mode by which it operates may be investigated. The laws of its action may be determined by observation.

Farr's Law Applied to AIDS Projections

Dennis J. Bregman, PhD, Alexander D. Langmuir, MD, MPH



SHORT REPORT

Open Access

Applying Farr's Law to project the drug overdose mortality epidemic in the United States

Salima Darakjy¹, Joanne E Brady^{1,2,3}, Charles J DiMaggio^{1,2,3} and Guohua Li^{1,2,3*}




Figure 1 Annual mortality from drug overdose in the United States 1980–2011, with projections through 2035 based on Farr's Law (grey data points).

National Center for Health Statistics

CDC > NCHS Home



[NCHS Pressroom](#)

[Weekly COVID-19 Mortality Overview](#)

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[Upcoming](#)


[Publications Archives](#)

Drug Overdose Deaths in the U.S. Top 100,000 Annually

For Immediate Release: November 17, 2021

Contact: CDC, National Center for Health Statistics, Office of Communication (301) 458-4800

E-mail: paquery@cdc.gov



52k deaths, peaking in 2017

Figure 1 Annual mortality from drug overdose in the United States 1980–2011, with projections through 2035 based on Farr’s Law (grey data points).

Farr's Law* Applied to COVID Projections

Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME)

Daily deaths [↗](#)

[Trend](#)

[Compare](#)

[Map](#)

Daily deaths is the best indicator of the progression of the pandemic, although there is generally a 17-21 day lag between infection and deaths.

Reported

Total

Both

Scenario ⓘ

Projection X

Masks X


Third dose X

▼




*IHME moved to slightly more realistic model in mid-2020

IHME Daily Covid-19 Deaths (log-scale)




Eric F. Lock
@Doc_Lock

These plots show actual reported deaths with mean reference model projections (each up to ~100 days ahead), with and without a log scale. Performance has been relatively better since Summer 2020, after all those projections to 0, but there are still notable misses...



https://twitter.com/Doc_Lock/status/1487073555208622081?s=20&t=WJfKGQRUp2R-I0lqEjUag

IHME Daily Covid-19 Deaths (log-scale)




The decline of the epidemic was less rapid than its rise, and the mortality was somewhat greater in the autumns of 1838 and 1839 than in the summers. But by taking the mean of the deaths in the third and fourth period, the mean of the deaths in the fourth and fifth period, &c., &c., a regular series of numbers is produced.



Eric F. Lock
@Doc_Lock

These plots show actual reported deaths with mean reference model projections (each up to ~100 days ahead), with and without a log scale. Performance has been relatively better since Summer 2020, after all those projections to 0, but there are still notable misses...



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We* keep using models we** know are wrong

SARS

H1N1

Ebola

Zika

SARS-CoV-2

*I'm not saying who “we” includes


**This “we” might not be the same subset

The SARS Scare

// A cautionary tale of emerging disease caught in the act

by Jonathan Shaw

At the height of the epidemic, one Canadian infectious-disease expert who had come down with SARS herself predicted that the virus would spread around the globe: “If we don’t have a vaccine—yes, we are all going to get it,” she told Canadian television. Her opinion was shared by many that spring.



This diagram detailing SARS transmission in Singapore shows the important role of “super-spreaders” in transmitting the disease. Five people caused more than half of the 205 cases there.

Network theory and SARS: predicting outbreak diversity

Lauren Ancel Meyers^{a,b,*,1}, Babak Pourbohloul^{c,1,2}, M.E.J. Newman^{b,d},
Danuta M. Skowronski^{c,2}, Robert C. Brunham^{c,2}

^a*Section of Integrative Biology and Institute for Cellular and Molecular Biology, University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station C0930, Austin, TX 78712, USA*

^b*Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA*


^c*University of British Columbia Centre for Disease Control, 655 West 12th Avenue, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V5Z 4R4*

^d*Center for the Study of Complex Systems, University of Michigan, Randall Laboratory, 500 E. University Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1120, USA*


Received 3 May 2004; received in revised form 6 July 2004; accepted 22 July 2004

Available online 23 September 2004


Poisson social contact network




Real-world social contact networks



(A)



(B)



(C)

Same R_0 , very different stories

1918 influenza

$R_0 \sim 2$

500,000,000 infected



2013-16 Ebola

$R_0 \sim 2$


30,000 infected





LETTERS

Superspreading and the effect of individual variation on disease emergence

J. O. Lloyd-Smith^{1,2}, S. J. Schreiber³, P. E. Kopp⁴ & W. M. Getz¹








Can we get a more “realistic” estimate of size?

1. the disease results either in complete immunity or death,
2. the disease is transmitted in a closed population,
3. all individuals are equally susceptible,
4. contacts occur according to the law of mass-action,
5. and a deterministic analysis is appropriate.


Beyond R_0 : heterogeneity in secondary infections and probabilistic epidemic forecasting

Laurent Hébert-Dufresne^{1,2,3}, Benjamin M. Althouse^{4,5,6},
Samuel V. Scarpino^{7,8,9,10,11,12} and Antoine Allard^{3,13}



Transmission of Delta variant vs. ancestral strain and other infectious diseases

Fatality rate
(log scale)



The New York Times

Original graph from 2/28/2020.

Delta variant is **more** transmissible than:

- MERS & SARS
- Ebola
- Common cold
- Seasonal flu & 1918 ("Spanish") flu
- Smallpox

Delta variant is **as** transmissible as:

- Chicken Pox

Note: Average case-fatality rates and transmission numbers are shown. Estimates of case-fatality rates can vary, and numbers for the new coronavirus are preliminary estimates.

There's a *potential* benefit to super spreading

PLOS BIOLOGY


ESSAY

Superspreading events in the transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2: Opportunities for interventions and control

Benjamin M. Althouse^{1,2,3}*, Edward A. Wenger¹, Joel C. Miller⁴, Samuel V. Scarpino^{5,6,7,8,9,10}, Antoine Allard^{11,12}, Laurent Hébert-Dufresne^{11,13,14}, Hao Hu¹⁵


There's a *potential* benefit to super spreading

No super-spreading, $R_0 = 2.6$




There's a *potential* benefit to super spreading

No super-spreading, $R_0 = 2.6$



Super-spreading, $R_0 = 2.6$, $k = 0.16$





Impact of human mobility on the emergence of dengue epidemics in Pakistan

Amy Wesolowski^{a,b}, Taimur Qureshi^c, Maciej F. Boni^{d,e}, Pål Roe Sundsøy^c, Michael A. Johansson^{b,f}, Syed Basit Rasheed^g, Kenth Engø-Monsen^c, and Caroline O. Buckee^{a,b,1}


^aDepartment of Epidemiology, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115; ^bCenter for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115; ^cTelenor Research, Telenor Group, N-1360 Fornebu, Norway; ^dOxford University Clinical Research Unit, Wellcome Trust Major Overseas Programme, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; ^eCentre for Tropical Medicine, Nuffield Department of Clinical Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford OX3 7FZ, United Kingdom; ^fDivision of Vector-Borne Diseases, Centers for Disease Control, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00920; and ^gDepartment of Zoology, University of Peshawar, Peshawar 25120, Pakistan

Edited by Burton H. Singer, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, and approved August 6, 2015 (received for review April 2, 2015)


Feasibility of controlling COVID-19 outbreaks by isolation of cases and contacts



Joel Hellewell, Sam Abbott*, Amy Gimma*, Nikos I Bosse, Christopher I Jarvis, Timothy W Russell, James D Munday, Adam J Kucharski, W John Edmunds, Centre for the Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Diseases COVID-19 Working Group, Sebastian Funk†, Rosalind M Eggo†





But, at low super-spreading (flu), k doesn't matter



Feasibility of controlling COVID-19 outbreaks by isolation of cases and contacts



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
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
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SARS-CoV-2 Wuhan



SARS-CoV-2 Omicron



Feasibility of controlling COVID-19 outbreaks by isolation of cases and contacts



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



Beyond R_0 : heterogeneity in secondary infections and probabilistic epidemic forecasting

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
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
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





Scarpino unpublished









We can't stop pandemics without using real-time, high-resolution mobility data.










Impact of human mobility on the emergence of dengue epidemics in Pakistan

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^aDepartment of Epidemiology, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115; ^bCenter for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115; ^cTelenor Research, Telenor Group, N-1360 Fornebu, Norway; ^dOxford University Clinical Research Unit, Wellcome Trust Major Overseas Programme, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; ^eCentre for Tropical Medicine, Nuffield Department of Clinical Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford OX3 7FZ, United Kingdom; ^fDivision of Vector-Borne Diseases, Centers for Disease Control, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00920; and ^gDepartment of Zoology, University of Peshawar, Peshawar 25120, Pakistan



Perhaps 5 million people left Wuhan in Jan 2020



Science


RESEARCH ARTICLES

Cite as: M. U. G. Kraemer *et al.*, *Science*
10.1126/science.abb4218 (2020).

The effect of human mobility and control measures on the COVID-19 epidemic in China

Moritz U. G. Kraemer^{1,2,3*}, Chia-Hung Yang⁴, Bernardo Gutierrez^{1,5}, Chieh-Hsi Wu⁶, Brennan Klein⁴, David M. Pigott⁷, Open COVID-19 Data Working Group†, Louis du Plessis¹, Nuno R. Faria¹, Ruoran Li⁸, William P. Hanage⁸, John S. Brownstein^{2,3}, Maylis Layan^{9,10}, Alessandro Vespignani^{4,11}, Huaiyu Tian¹², Christopher Dye¹, Oliver G. Pybus^{1,13*}, Samuel V. Scarpino^{4*}


People act before measures go into place



<https://covid19.gleamproject.org/mobility>




But they didn't all go to the same place




Or said differently, a physicist didn't just "turn up the temp" :)

Wuhan -> Nanjing






But they didn't all go to the same place

Wuhan -> Shanghai






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







Spatial scales of COVID-19 transmission in Mexico


Brennan Klein^{*1,2}, Harrison Hartle¹, Munik Shrestha¹, Ana Cecilia Zenteno³,
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 Jose Alberto Diaz-Quinonez^{*†15}, Samuel V. Scarpino^{*‡1,16,17}, and
 Moritz U.G. Kraemer^{*§9,18}






What did we learn about contagion from COVID-19?

- Everything is about meta-population dynamics.
- We need more empirical data on real-world networks.
- Super-spreading is under-appreciated for control.
- Behavior, behavior, behavior
- And the number one thing?



We can't stop pandemics without using real-time, high-resolution mobility data.



Questions?

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